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My contribution to the debate on the topics raised by the Workshop (the social stress of 
immigrants as a possible cause of terrorism) is based on selected literature in the field 
of sociology of migration. In the first part of the paper, I consider the issue of 
integration of Muslim immigrants in Europe, showing how controversial the same 
concept of integration is. I then analyze how the integration of Muslim minorities has 
become a highly politicized matter all over Europe, raising questions about the forms 
of recognition that should be granted by the European states to immigrant minorities in 
order to allow them to keep their religious and cultural specificities in the frame of 
European laws and values. Muslim minorities have been extremely visible, because of 
their   political mobilizations on various topics (marches by French citizens of North 
African origin, called “beur”; demonstrations against the Salman Rushdie’s book 
“Satanic Verses” in the UK; debates and manifestations demonstrations on the veil 
issue in France and Italy; strong participation in the anti-war movement in the UK…). 
The predominant reactions of the European public opinion to Muslims’ requests have 
gone from suspicion to the clear hostility, legitimized by political groups –generally at 
the right or the extreme right, as the Front National in France, the British National 
Party (BNP), the Northern League in Italy, who consider Muslims in general as a threat 
to European culture and organize demonstrations or counter-demonstrations to oppose 
the opening of mosques, the recognition of Muslim feasts in schools
1
, the authorization 
of veil in public offices etc.  
The negative attitude of European public opinion  towards Muslims in general is 
not a consequence of the 11
th
 of September, even if it has become stronger afterwards. 
In 1997 a report titled Islamophobia: a Challenge For Us All by the Runnymede Trust, 
an organization founded in 1968 to challenge racism and promote multi-ethnicity in the 
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 The latest is the Italian former Minister of the Berlusconi  Government, Roberto Calderoli, who has 
organized a “pig day” to protest against the opening of a new Mosque in Bologna (Repubblica, 14th of 
September 2007). The same man became famous because he went to television with a tee-shirt showing the 
Danish drawings, during the Danish cartoons crisis. The result of his action were big anti-Italian 
demonstrations in Lybia (where Italian television is largely watched) and 11 deaths during the attack on the 
Italian consulate in Bengazi… 
Psychosocial Stress in Immigrants and in Members of Minority Groups
as a Factor of Terrorist Behavior - M. Finklestein and K. Dent-Brown (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2008





, defines for the first time the concept of Islamophobia, drafting its eight main 
characters.  
In the second part of the paper, I question the connexion between Islamophobia 
and the development of an Islamic fundamentalist political movement at world level. In 
fact most researches tend to show that the radical fundamentalist ideology is followed 
only by a tiny minority of Muslim immigrants in Europe, – first and/or second 
generation, according to the countries - represented by a limited number of 
organizations. The majority of Muslim immigrants are strongly against terrorism and 
condemn 9/11 [1, 2, 3, 4]. Reasons for Islamophobia must also be sought inside 
European societies, where in spite of official discourses on tolerance immigrants and 
strangers (not only Muslim ones) are “constructed” as “deviants”, “criminals”, 
“enemies”, a threat to  “security”. In order to clarify the phenomenon, I analyze briefly 
Bauman’s work on immigration and security [5]; I consider the theory of “moral panic” 
as a combination of reality and social construction.  
Without denying the reality of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism as a world 
phenomenon, the social construction of Muslims in Europe as “terrorists”
3
 is extremely 
dangerous not only in respect to social cohesion: the growing Islamophobia
4
 in Europe 
makes the fight against the terrorist challenge more difficult. In fact, the Islamophobic 
approach does not make any distinction between a minority of fundamentalists (among 
whom, we count as well “autochthonous” Europeans, converted to Islam), who reject 
the “West” and the “system” in total, and the majority of the immigrant Muslim 
population, who are against terrorism
5
 and could react against it, but who also demand 
the recognition of their specificity and respect for their opinions. This confusion 
provokes resentment among the general Muslim population hostile to terrorism and 
largely contributes to produce the “social stress” that is evoked as topic of the 
Workshop.  
Finally, in the last two paragraphs, I present briefly two pieces of research on 
Muslims in Europe in which I have taken part in. The first one was done in the UK 
about the participation of young Muslims to the alter global movement and especially 
the Stop the war coalition. The second study, done in Italy, looked at the participation 
of young Muslims to associative life in general. The researchers show how young 
Muslims participation in social movements is an answer to immigrant communities’ 
isolation and is an expression of a double Muslim/European identity.  Radical political 
points of view on world conflicts (rejection of the Bush administration policy and of 
the “USA imperialism”) do not coincide at all with ideology of jihadism or support for 




 Basques should then as well be accused of terrorism because of ETA! 
4
 On the 18th December 2006, in Vienna, the European Monitoring  Center on Racism and Xenophobia has 
presented the Report “Muslims in the European Union: discrimination and Islamophobia.” It contains the 
existing data on discrimination of which Muslims are victims in the labour market, education and housing. 
Islamophobic acts go from simple verbal threats to attacks on persons and properties. The Report presents a 
long list of actions, from physical aggression up to arson.  “Such behaviours are illegal. It is consequently 
necessary to produce a political guide to deal with the problem. Assuring equal treatment to all Europeans, 
independently from their origin. “ the director of the EUMC has declared, see http://eumc.europa.eu 
5
  Surveys done among the Muslim population in the UK in November 2001 showed that 81% considered 
the attack on the Twin   Towers to be unjustified. (ICM Press Release 14 November 2001 - 
http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2001/today-muslims-poll-nov-2001.htm) 
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terrorism
6
.  Both researches show the complexity of the issue concerning these young 
people’s identity, which is simultaneously European and Muslim.  
Muslim immigrants’ integration in Europe 
There is no doubt that after the 11
th
 of September, the participation of immigrants or 
people of immigrant origin in terrorist attacks in Spain or in the UK, and the discovery 
of cells of Islamic fundamentalists ready to enter action in various European countries 
have raised a lot of emotion all over Europe. Scholars of different disciplines - 
sociology, psychology, and political sciences - have tried to understand the causes of 
these actions and the motivations of terrorists, looking also at their personal histories.  
These facts have further encouraged the development of a common sense that accused 
Muslims of being unable to integrate into Western, liberal, modern societies because of 
their culture
7
, adding the equation between Muslims and terrorists which has been 
legitimized by the media and by the discourses of some political activists, generally at 
the extreme right of the political landscape. Media and simplistic political discourses 
establish as a “self-evident fact” automatic links between causes (for example the 
Islamic culture) and effects (the participation in terrorist movements). This type of 
discourse ignores the possibility that social realities are the product of complex 
interactions and processes of definition and significations
8
.  
Any such generalisation can only be a stereotype. The migratory trajectories of 
Muslims vary according to the different European countries: Muslim presence dates 
back to more than fifty or sixty years in the UK and France, where various generations 
are present, while it is relatively recent in Italy, Spain and Greece, which have become 
immigration countries only during the eighties of the past century.  
The most important arrivals of Muslims into Europe are part of the so-called post-
colonial migration.  After World War 2, migratory flows of Muslims, directed towards 
Centre-Northern Europe have been strongly influenced by colonial links. For France, 
the areas of reference were the Maghrebian countries, particularly Algeria, for the 
United Kingdom, the Indian Sub-continent, for Holland, Indonesia and Suriname. 
Germany, which did not have a strong colonial past, became the destination for Turkish 
immigrants, thanks also to previous links between the Prussian and the Ottoman 
Empires.  These are mainly flows of low-qualified workers and of a small percentage 
of intellectuals and students.   It is important to notice, that, during the fifties and the 
sixties, that is the first phase of post-war migration to Europe, immigrants were mainly 
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 For example, the attack ob the Twin Towers can be perceived as terrorism and strongly condemned, but not 
the insurgency in Iraq or the actions of the Hezbollah in Lebanon or of Hamas in Palestine.  
7
 The borders of modernity and of West are very fluid: there are niches that reject modernity inside the so-
called western world and there are niches of post-modernity in the non-western world…Just to give an 
example: the opposition to the teaching of the evolution in some USA states because of the Christian 
fundamentalists is certainly not an example of modernity…in the national museum of Lhasa, Tibet-China, on 
the contrary, the Darwinian theory is clearly shown and children of the Tibetan schools go to visit it and learn 
the theory of evolution…Is not the acceptance of the scientific knowledge is a clear sign of modernity? Then 
the Tibet is certainly more modern than a few United States where evolution cannot be taught in schools… 
8
 This approach ignores also that in many countries of the Muslim Arabic world, the local identity cannot be 
reduced to an Arab Islamic culture, as some power discourses or fundamentalist discourses tend to do. Take 
for example the Maghrebian identity: it is the expression of a culture rich in Berberian, Jewish, Andalusian, 
Turkish, Italian, Spanish and French elements that appear in music, architecture, cooking, dialects [6]. 
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considered “workers” and little attention was paid to their religious faith. The same 
idea of integration of these migrants was by the way neglected, given the fact that they 
were not supposed to settle in Europe.  
It is only from the late seventies and the eighties that immigrants begin to settle in 
Europe. During this time the settlement process for Muslims began: “the activation of 
the Islamic belonging as one of the main sources of a strong identity, both on the 
personal and the collective level, in connection with the need of finding roots in the 
urban areas.” (Massari, 2006, p.39) [7]. In the perspective of a permanent settlement, 
religious buildings were opened. The interaction with public administrations, health 
and social services and schools also became more and more frequent. In this 
interaction, the first requests to have the possibility of living according to the Islamic 
religion rules were made. 
The settlement of the immigrant populations has forced the European countries to 
think and to implement integration policies.  But, what does integration mean? In the 
early 1960s, two Italian sociologists, Francesco Alberoni and Roberto Baglioni, defined 
the concept of integration thus: “Integration must be a reciprocal exchange of human 
experiences on the psychological level, it must be a cultural exchange from which a 
larger and more mature experience may emerge and must represent an insertion of the 
immigrant in the new social structure as a vital and functional part that makes the 
whole richer” (Alberoni and Baglioni: 1965, 26) [8]. The two sociologists 
differentiated ‘integration’ from ‘cultural assimilation’: in the integration process, a 
reciprocal exchange takes place at the level of the individuals, while the social structure 
is enriched by the presence of immigrants.  
These ideas focus on the exchange, but this exchange takes place inside an 
institutional frame defined by the hosting state. Philosophies of integration – and 
political discourses - reflect a broader framework of national identity politics and are 
deeply rooted into the national order of things.  Integration policies reflect an 
integration ‘model’ – they have a normative aspect, proposing a type of interaction 
between two populations to be implemented. Consequently, if integration is more a 
norm than a theoretical notion, can indicators scientifically measure it? Do not 
indicators also depend on the political model of integration?  
 Moreover, integration is a lengthy, dynamic process that extends to different 
spheres of social life and has multiple dimensions: cultural, social and economic. 
Immigrant groups that are well integrated from the economic point of view can 
preserve key cultural specificities: it is the case, for example, all over Europe, of 
diaspora groups, such as the Chinese communities. Other groups can be culturally 
integrated, because of previous anticipatory socialization (Alberoni, Baglioni, 1965
9
) 
[8] , but can have economic difficulties (it is the case, for example, of the “culturally 
close” Albanians in Italy or Greece, and, more recently, of the European, Christian 
                                                          
9 The most important contribution of the quoted Italian sociologists Alberoni and Baglioni as regards the 
future developments of sociology of migration was the notion of ‘anticipatory socialisation’, which they used 
to describe the processes immigrants experience in their trajectories from the areas of origin towards the 
industrial society. ‘Anticipatory socialisation’ means that, before leaving their country, immigrants obtain 
information on the societies where they are about to go to and consider these societies as ‘models’ of what 
should be life today. Consequently, immigrants are ‘prepared’ to the integration processes that take place in 
the receiving society: they become adapted to the new society because this is the ‘dominant model’, while the 
one they have been socialised in is considered to change or to disappear. The notion of ‘anticipatory 
socialisation’ has recently been used to understand processes of integration for some groups of foreign 
immigrants in Italy, as, for example, the Albanians and the Tunisians. The phenomenon does not necessarily 
produce the same effects as it did in the 1960s. 
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In fact, whatever definition or model of integration we can choose,  integration is a 
collective process, shared by the whole population, both the natives and the 
immigrants: it has to do with a general model of living together. When difficulties 
arise, these come from both sides. A conflict concerning the countries of settlement and 
the ones of origin of the immigrants affects the integration processes: it was the case 
for Algerians in France during and after the conflict there; it is the case for the 
participation of the UK in the war in Iraq. Consequently, given the ambiguity of the 
concept of integration, the issues raised by the Muslim presence in Europe vary 
according to the historical periods and the national contexts. 
Moreover, most researches on the Muslim communities in Europe do not describe 
them as a monolithic reality: on the contrary, the Muslim presence is characterized by a 
great internal pluralism [10]
11
. This is because of different factors: “the various national 
origins, the various interpretations of Islam, to which they make reference, the different 
organisations that, referring to these interpretations, tend to structure Islam in Europe.” 
(Cesari, Pacini, 2005, p. XI) [10] In this variety, groups supporting Islamic 
fundamentalism (which is also a complex concept) are a tiny minority. In this complex 
panorama, the level of integration of Muslims in Europe can vary within the same 
Muslim population, some groups or individuals being integrated and some others no, 
according to the indicators chosen.   
Muslims’ mobilizations and integration processes in the UK, France and Italy.  
In this paragraph, we will briefly summarize the main “political” issues that have been 
raised during the processes of settlement and integration in the two old immigration 
countries: the UK and France; and in a new immigration country, Italy.  
 The United Kingdom 
It is precisely in the United Kingdom that a few young boys of the second generation 
Muslims have shifted towards terrorism, creating suspicion and fear against the all-
Muslim population. According to the last census in 2001, Muslims represent around 1.5 
million people, around 2.7% of the population, settled in the great urban areas of 
London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford and Leeds. The majority of them come 
from Pakistan (42.5%) and Bangladesh (16.8%), in less measure from India (8.5%), 
while the rest has its origins in the Balkans (7,5%), as Bosnians and Albanians, and 
Africa (6,5%), mainly Somalis and Nigerians (Peach 2005). It is the youngest 
population among the minority groups, one third being between zero and fifteen years, 
and only the 10% over sixty years (against the 18% of the total population). 
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 As an Italian expert has declared during a recent research on indicators of integration: “The concept of 
integration is difficult because the models that we had before are all failing. Before that they were considered 
as good. Each model has, however, some good things. Let’s take the English model. Focusing the autonomy, 
including the religious one, of the religious groups. Then it has appeared that this must be compatible with 
common norms; probably this had been neglected. Or the French model, on the contrary the focus is on the 
common norms. This model underestimates the needs of a certain diversification. Each model has good 
aspects” (Interview with Franco Pittau, Caritas, Rome, reported in Campani, 2006, p.36) [11]. 
11
 [10]. 
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As noticed in the previous paragraph, Muslims arrived in the UK in the fifties and 
sixties, as part of a post-colonial migration, for work purpose. Their goal was not 
initially settlement; in fact they kept for long time the myth of return and strong links 
with their countries of origin [4]. In the first phase of migration, identifying themselves 
as workers, they took part in the trade unions and left-wing politics. For example, the 
Indian Workers Associations contributed to the fight for the rights of the immigrant 
workers and  politically organised their members in support of the Labour Party. 
It is only after the seventies that the Muslim communities, in their process of 
settlement, started to address to the British authorities, first at local level, then at 
national level, a certain number of requests in order to raise the possibility of living 
according to the Islamic religious rules.  These requests concerned for example the 
teaching of Islamic religion in schools, the presence of halal food in school and factory 
restaurants, the enlargement of the crime of blasphemy to the Islamic religion, at the 
same level as for  Christianity. This request became particularly important after the 
publication of the Salman Rushdie’s Satanic Verses . It was, by the way, the 
mobilisation about this book that contributed to give visibility to the Muslims in the 
British society (Werbner 2002). Without entering in the merit of the question, there is 
no doubt that, from the side of the Muslim communities, this mobilisation appeared 
first of all as a demand for recognition. For British and European public opinion, it 
appeared, on the contrary, as a manifestation of intolerance and fundamentalism 
presenting a challenge to the policies of multiculturalism, chosen by the United 
Kingdom to deal with immigrants. In fact, since the eighties, a long period of 
negotiation started between the representatives of the Muslim communities and the 
national and local authorities of the European countries. A negotiation which is still 
going on around various topics (Muslim schools, rejection of mixed sex education, 
sharpie tribunals...etc…).  
In the UK, hostility to Muslims did not start on the 11th of September, but it has 
become worse since. After the introduction of the Terrorism Act in 2001, there has 
been a growth of 302% of the cases of Stop & Search
12
 of Muslims, compared to 230% 
for blacks and 112%for whites between 2001 and 2003
13
.   
The Muslim community in the UK is far from being homogeneous and is rich with 
numerous associations and movements. The most important is Muslim Council of 
Britain (MCB), a moderate organisation close to the Labour Party
14
. Other 
organisations are the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the Muslim Parliament 
of Great Britain (MPGB). Founded in 1997 by Kamal El-Helbawy, European speaker 
of the “Muslim Brothers”, the MAB’s goal is “to promote and spread the principles of 
a positive interactions between Muslims and all the other elements of the British 
Society. ” MAB wants to bring Muslim values inside the British society, creating a 
collaboration dialogue. Through local committees MAB promotes campaign on 
different questions (from the retirement of British troops in Iraq to the protest against 
the French law against wearing the veil). 
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 This is carried out to search for drugs, weapons, stolen objects.  
13
 Cfr. The Indipendent 22/11/2004 “Islamophobia makes British Muslims fell increasingly “isolated” in 
their own country” 
  
14
 Following the London attacks, in July 2005, the 19th of July, the Muslim Council of Britain was invited 
to Downing Street  as representative of the Muslim community to create a task force to encourage mediations 
to oppose the development of fundamentalism in the communities (The Guardian, 19/07/2005 “Blair plea to 
Muslim leaders at n° 10 meeting”) 
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The Muslim Parliament presents a political, not a religious platform. Its main 
campaigns have focused on the rejection of the Antiterrorism Act, seen as result of a 
discrimination process against Muslims and against  forced marriage, in collaboration 
with the Institute of Muslim Women. In fact, many Muslim women’s associations have 
also developed in the UK. In the last paragraph, we will analyse the participation of 
young Muslims alter-global and Stop the war movement. 
France 
It is in France that the highest number of Muslims in Europe is settled: estimates, 
referring to people coming from Islamic countries speak of around five million people, 
the majority from Maghreb (First Algeria, then Tunisia and Morocco), many of whom 
have French nationality. In fact, in the French integration model, the nation is a 
universal entity that includes not only the “ethnic French”, but all the people who, 
living in France, accept the republican principles of society. It is the republican model 
of integration.  
Referring to the children of the immigrants from Maghreb (a third and even a 
fourth generation is present in France), terms as “young people of foreign origin” or “of 
North African origin” are often used, while similar expressions are rarely used for 
young people of Italian, Spanish or Portuguese origin. This shows the suspicion 
concerning the allegiance to France and to the Republic by the Muslims, because of the 
references to Islam (while the Republic is secular), but also because of the colonial past 
(the Algerian war). In fact, the condition of the descendents of the Muslim immigrants 
is difficult in terms of housing and jobs. Confined in the peripheral areas, they are two 
or three times more likely to be unemployed than other young French people.   
The demand for recognition by the second and third generations of Maghrebian 
origin has taken various forms, according to the periods. It took the form of a secular 
movement during the eighties: this was the beur movement, whose goals were the 
universal fight against racism, the participation in political national and local life and 
the civic rights for those excluded from French society, parked in the ghettos of the 
peripheral areas
15
. Associations of a religious type started in the nineties, questioning 
the monopoly of the secular Arab elite [10]  in the political arena. They represent a 
very scattered and differentiated movement, questioning the republican separation 
between the public sphere and the private one, the only one where religion is 
legitimized. This movement is fuelled by the national controversy about the veil in 
school, which, started in the eighties and has continued for over fifteen years, until the 
approval of a law in 2004, prohibiting the religious signs (first of all the veil) in the 
public schools. It is however far from being hegemonic in a community, which is 
extremely inhomogeneous.  The riots in the peripheral areas –banlieues-, which 
exploded during the fall of 2005, would be the result of a contrast between the 
socialization in the French society and the socio-economic exclusion. As O.Roy 
(2002)[12]  has written, the situation in the peripheral areas has more to do with: “the 
ethnicization of a space of social exclusion than with the creation of a religious ghetto. 
The culture of the young beurs is an urban Western subculture and not an importation 
from the Middle East.” (Roy, 2002, p.62) [12]. 
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 The movement was strongly encouraged by a Catholic priest from Lyon. The leader of the anti-racist 
movement that emerged from the “Beur marche”- Touche pas a mon pote (Don’t touche my friend)- from 
Lyon to Paris, was not a Maghrebian. Harlem Désir was a Guadaloupéen. His references were the Black 
Americano civic rights movement. By the way his name came from Harlem, the New York Black area…  
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The definition “Muslims” doesn’t correspond, in fact, to a homogeneous cultural 
community. The French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar (1997) [1], in L’Islam des 
jeunes, proposes and ideal-typical classification of the young French declaring 
themselves Muslims:  
-The Islam of integration that fills the emptiness provoked by the end of great social 
utopia and the disillusion with the French republican model.  They claim a 
Muslim-French or French-Muslim identity, as sounds the slogan of the Union of 
the Young Muslims (Union des Junes Musulmans): “French yes, but also 
Muslims; 
-The Islam of exclusion concerns those who react to the social exclusion by renouncing 
participation in French society in the name of transcendent rules and finding 
shelter in an Islam seen mainly as religion of the submission to God: 
-The radical Islamism is definitely a minority phenomenon, which sees in the 
opposition to the Western society, the only way towards rescue. This minority 
typology is however overrepresented by the media.  
It must be stressed that since 2003, a Conseil français du culte musulman (CFCM) 
is charged to institutionalise the forms of the religious practices.  
Italy 
With the arrival of immigrants, in the eighties, Islam became the second religion in the 
previously mono-religious country of Italy. Today Muslims (immigrants and Italian 
converted
16
) are estimated between 700,000 and 1 million people. Most important 
national groups of Muslims are the Moroccans and Albanians, followed by Tunisians 
and Senegalese. Maghrebians, mostly from Morocco and Tunisia, represent the central 
group for Muslim immigration in Italy (around 30% of Muslims in Italy is made up of 
Moroccans), and are divided into Arabs and Berbers, both Sunni groups. Other Muslim 
national groups are Senegalese, Egyptians, Bengali, Albanians (16% of the Muslim 
total), Bosnians, Kurds, and Roma from the Balkans, Ghanaians, Nigerians, Somalis, 
and Iranians etc. Each national group may display different Islamic beliefs: many 
Senegalese are part of the Muridiya confraternity [13], a Sufi confraternity; Iranians 
and some Iraqis are Shiite; Moroccans, Tunisians, Egyptians are Sunni; Bosnians and 
Albanians express a very secular Islam
17
; among Roma, coming from the Balkans, 
there is an important Sufi
 
 component. 
The increase “visibility” process “in the physical and symbolical space” (Gritti, 
2001, p.29) [2] dates back only twenty years. The first Italian mosque was opened in 
Catania in 1980: the Libyan government financed its construction. From the nineties 
onwards, the visibility process increased: “New mosques are opened; aid and funding 
arrive from foundations; nearly everywhere, in the public space, signs of the Muslim 
presence appear.” (Gritti, 2001, p.29) [2].  Public opinion and the media first ignored 
this process; then a negative reaction began inside Italian society. In a few years, 
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 The converted Italians should be approximately 70.000, according to estimations, but it is 
extremely difficult to verify such number. 
17
 National origins are important to understand how Islam is practiced. Albanians, who are 
considered at the 70% Muslims have experienced a Communist regime, which taught State atheism. Even 
Albanians who consider themselves Muslims have a secular idea of Islam. Many Kurds are  Alewiti, who 
have an open view about the women’s condition and a secular idea of Islam; among Kurds and Berbers the 
pre-Islamic tradition is not completely forgotten and is sometimes rediscovered as an identity mark. 
Senegalese do not go to the mosque very often. They practice Islam inside their brotherhoods.  
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Muslims, the Muslim community and the Muslim religion became the object of violent 
verbal attacks by some Catholic bishops and of aggression, not only verbal but also 
physical, by some Italian political parties like the Northern League.  
Hostile religious and political forces accuse Muslim immigrants of “structural” 
inability to integrate, because of some characteristics ascribed to Islam, as misogynous, 
intolerant and retrograde. Islam is described as eternal and monolithic, mostly oriented 
towards the past and unchangeable in its essence, whose “natural” properties are 
fanaticism, traditionalism, irrationalism and obscurantism (Gritti, 2001, p.35)[2].  
As in other countries, in Italy too, Muslim immigrants are extremely diversified
18
.  
Researches show the existence of typologies of Muslims, who live their religion and 
practice it in different ways, both individually and collectively [14, 15, 16, 17, 3, 2, 18, 
19, 20]: spiritual interpretations of Islam, which do not require rituality, rigid respect 
for the five pillars, combination of religion and tradition, communitarian activities are 
just some of the multiple forms the “Islams” of Italy express.  
Multiple actors represent Muslims in Italy. Organisations, associations, religious or 
national groups, brotherhoods defend different points of view on religion and politics; 
they have different references and support outside Italy: official Islam of the countries 
of origin, brotherhoods, and political movements… Diversity and divisions have not 
helped Muslims in establishing, with the Italian State, a legal “Agreement”, for 
guaranteeing the free expression of their religion and assuring the State necessary 
support to implement the right to religious practice (help in building the mosques, 
presence of halal food in schools, holidays, etc….). Such an agreement is, in fact, both 
for Muslims and for the Italian State, a complex task: Muslim organisations are not 
united (some forces are accused of being too radical and even jihadist) and the Italian 
State is influenced by political forces hostile to a recognized Islamic presence.   
Magdi Allam (2001) [18] talks of 214 Islamic religious places in Italy, 
distinguishing between Mosques
19
; Islamic cultural centres, which have structures and 
an organization able to offer, apart from cultural activity, cultural information, social 
assistance and institutional mediation (around 30); Islamic centres which have cultural 
activities, Koran teaching courses and religious practices (around 80); and finally, just 
religion places. 
Each mosque or centre has a different religious – and also political - orientation. 
The fact that each mosque has a specific orientation depends on the Islamic 
confessions: Sunni, Shia, and Sufi. The different beliefs, already, represent a wide 
range of religious ways of life in the general framework called Islam.  Another 
difference depends on the political orientation, in the sense of the attitude to political 
Islam. Some mosques have a more indirect, moderate political position; others are 
considered close to fundamentalism.   
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 According to Gritti (2001 [2]), in Italy it would be more pertinent to speak about “Islams”, 
using the plural, and not of “one” Unitarian Islam.   
19
 The most well known mosque in Italy is the one of Monte Antenne in Rome, officially open on 
June 1995, thanks to the support of the city of Rome, which gave a piece of land, and to the financial support 
of Saudi Arabia. This mosque is the biggest in Europe, able to welcome 2000 people. The project of the 
Mosque of Rome date back to 1974, but it took over 20 years to be finished. The costs for the building of the 
Mosque have been paid by Saudi Arabia through the League of the Islamic World, a Saudi organisation 
which has three goals: assuring the support of Islam at the international level, mainly where Muslims 
represent a minority, to promote Islamic mission with the non Muslim and to control the type of Islam which 
is practiced.   
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Andrea Pacini (2000) makes a precise analysis of the typologies of Islam which is 
expressed in the different forms of organisations and initiatives existing in Italy: 
initiatives which are more or less directed by Muslim states or that refer somehow to 
the official Islam of the states, religious brotherhoods and movements which unite 
strictly the religious dimension to the political dimensions. Pacini admits that at local 
level, in local initiatives, it is common to find combinations, supra-positions, synergies 
between one level and the other, one organisation and the other. Pacini’s analysis 
shows the different conflicts existing between the initiatives supported by the States 
and the political Islam, which the States try to counter-act, but also between the States 
(for example between the Saudi royal dynasty and the Moroccan dynasty for the 
control of the Mosque of Rome)
20
.  
It should not be forgotten however; that the majority of the Muslims in Italy do not 
go regularly to the mosque or to Islamic cultural centres and have a quite secular 
attitude to religion. Practising can be a matter of personal engagement (praying five 
time a day, eating halal food, respecting Ramadan…) more than going regularly to the 
mosques or the Islamic cultural centres. This is what appears from different researches, 
which have been done in Italy, which show the predominance of personal 
interpretations of Islam, identified with spiritual values.  
Security, immigrants and “moral panic” 
We have seen that in various European countries, the growing visibility of Muslims 
and their demand for recognition of religious practices have become political matters 
and have raised hostility long before the 11
th
 of September.  Muslims are a component 
of immigration, which is also object of negative reactions: “Extra-European 
immigrants who come to Europe to look for asylum and work are seen as threatening 
aliens…(…) There is a growing trend in Europe, to give responsibility of all the socio-
economic problems –unemployment, lack of housing, criminality, welfare- to the 
immigrants, who are deprived of “our moral and cultural values”, simply for the fact 
that they are among us.”   (Stolcke, 2000, p. 158-159) [21]. 
The hostility towards immigrants is largely a “constructed phenomenon” –not 
dependant on the objective “threat” represented by immigrants- that, according to some 
scholars, is a product of the post-modern condition and the change in the perception of 
security and risk. In his book, The loneliness of the global citizen (2000)[5], Zigmut 
Bauman analyzes the concept of security, considering three dimensions: security, 
certainty, safety
 
, which are the conditions of self-security and self-confidence. The 
lack of one of these components provokes a sense of insecurity; or, it is upon the 
conditions of self-security and of self-confidence that the capacity of acting and 
thinking in a rational way depends. (Baumann, 2000, p 25)[5]. The lack of one of these 
components provokes a sense of insecurity, nourishing “the anxiety, the search for a 
scapegoat and the aggression.” (Ibidem, p.25).  The lack of existential security is a 
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 Pacini gives an interesting example of the differences of affiliation  among  mosques in Italy. In Turin, 
Pacini says, near two mosques ruled by imam close to the Muslim brothers, there is a mosque (or better a 
prayer room) ruled by a Moroccan imam of wahabi tendency (close to the Islam represented by Saudi Arabia 
and the Saudian family), and one, recently opened, for Afghans and Pakistanis close to the Islamic movement 
of  Jama’at al-islami.        
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consequence of the development of economic liberalism that produces the perception of 
a precarious existence; the lack of certainty depends from the difficulty in 
understanding the reality, of foreseeing the events and putting them in an ordered 
understandable process. Finally safety has to do with the personal and individual 
dimension of security that concerns the body and its extension, as the family members 
and the personal goods and properties. These three images of security overlap 
necessarily.   
Individuals, alone or collectively, are not able to oppose to deep causes of 
precariousness, uncertainty and insecurity that arise every day, in a time of 
globalization. Bauman considers as causes of insecurity, the new world disorder, 
characterized by the end of clear divisions, natural borders, of clear interests and 
political  strategies;  universal deregulation, because of the irrationality and the moral 
blindness of the market competition; freedom without limits guaranteed to capital and 
finance, but denied to persons; the weakness of social networks of trust, (…), the image 
of a fragmented reality… 
Western societies are going through a phase of transition where trajectories of 
social mobility and redefined, traditional representative systems are in crisis, individual 
and collective identities are questioned.  Given that the governments cannot promise 
their citizens “a secure existence and a certain future”, they can be harsh against threats 
that are close and visible as immigrants at the borders or in the cities: collective 
uncertainties are reduced to private worries that can find a political answer in the 
policies of law and order. Immigrants are the easy scapegoat of these policies. 
Another interesting theory clarifies the mechanisms of construction of immigrants 
as scapegoats: the moral panics.  S. Cohen theorized the concept of  “moral panic” in 
his famous book Folk Devils and Moral Panics. The Creation of the Mods and the 
Rockers (1972)[22]. He analyzed how an event of young people looting generated a 
strong social reaction, because of a campaign set up by the media, and of the harsher 
action by police. Cohen used the term “moral panic” to indicate the overwhelming 
reaction of the media, the public, the social control agencies to a case of youth 
criminality. For moral panic, the author defines: “A condition, an event, when a person 
or a group of persons begin to de defined as a threat to some values or interests of the 
society: its nature is presented in a simplified way and stereotyped by the media; moral 
barricades are erected by editors, politicians religious people and other 
thinkers/intellectuals; recognized experts pronounce their diagnosis and suggest 
possible solutions. (…) Sometimes the subject that has provoked the panic is relatively 
new; in other cases it existed before, but it becomes central.  Sometimes the panic is 
forgotten and just something is left in the collective memory; in other cases, it can last 
longer and produce changes even in the ways how a society perceive itself.” (1972, p. 
9)[22]. Finally, the reaction of a society to some events depends upon the perception of 
these facts as a threat to some “positions, status, interests, ideologies and values” 
(Cohen, 1972, p. 191)[22]. 
The interesting aspect in a situation of moral panic is that we face a reality that is 
partly objective, but partly socially constructed (through the media, public opinion, the 
organizations of social control, political institutions). Islamic fundamentalism is 
certainly a political threat: however, the common sense that today presents Islamic 
fundamentalism as a “natural character” of the Arabic culture or, worse, of the Arab 
people, ignores the political strategies used to mobilize by different political agents, the 
political discourses, the historical memories, the great variety of the contexts, the 
shifting identifications of the individuals.  There are no serious studies, at the moment, 
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showing that Muslims in Europe are at special risk for being recruited by 
fundamentalist terrorist cells. In any case, as for other terrorisms, it can be defeated by 
political means and not through the stigmatization of a people. What researches show is 
that there are problems of drop out from schools and of deviant behaviours among 
second generation immigrants all over Europe. As far as crimes are concerned it should 
be looked carefully at some specific areas and at some specific crimes –mainly 
connected with drug addiction, drug selling, trafficking, prostitution, rape… The 
equation Muslims-terrorists is a discourse tending to create moral panic used by some 
politicians for their political purposes.  
Young Muslims in the Uk and in Italy: political participation and identity  
In this last section, we give voice to some young people belonging to the second 
generation of Muslims in the UK and in Italy interviewed during two research studies 
done in the last four years.  From the interviews it appears that the fact of being 
Muslim is an identity which it is impossible to get rid of, because –independently from 
the personal auto-identification- it depends much from the “look” of the other. Even 
young Muslims who are not openly engaged in activities –either in secular associations 
or in mosques- are touched by the general climate of suspicion that sometimes concerns 
even close persons, as the friends.  
In the UK, the research –done by the University of Rome, Antimo Farro and 
Emmanuele Toscano in collaboration with the University of Florence- had as object the 
immigrants’ participation to the alter-global movement and has especially focused 
upon the Stop the War movement and the London Social Forum of October 2004. The 
coalition Stop the War was founded the 21 September 2001 during a public meeting to 
which more than 2000 people took part at the Friends Meeting House in London
21
, 
after the attacks on the twin towers in New York and the reaction of the Bush 
administration that declared “war on terror”. It is, in fact, to this war that the name of 
the coalition refers.  The organisations that have become members of the coalition is: 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Respect! Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 
plus some Muslim organisations as the already mentioned Muslim Association of 
Britain (MAB) and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain (MPGB). Other 
organisations as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) at the beginning took part in 
STOP the War constitution, but then they preferred the external support because of an 
orientation considered too extremist (they are close to the Trotskyism) and the critics to 
the Labour Party, to which the MCB is close
 
. 
The results of the research tend to show that young Muslims –especially young 
women- take part into these movements in the attempt of being at the same time 
Muslims and British, as a reaction to the hostility they have been victims of after the 
11th of September and an answer to the risk of auto-isolation of the community. After 
the 11
th
 of September, the discrimination became very strong, and the reaction of the 
young people is to participate more, to become more visible, instead of hiding 
themselves.  This is for example the opinion of two young women interviewed, 
activists of STOP the War:  
“We have become aware that we are darker, different. Our parents were 
immigrants who had come here to work. We, the second generation, born, grown and 
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educated in the UK, have never perceived ourselves as immigrants, but as British. Or, 
after the 11th of September, press has started to come here, in Birmingham, asking the 
Muslim population. Are you British? Are you Muslim? I consider it very offensive”   
(interview with a young woman, activist of the coalition Stop the war, London) 
“My father, my brothers and all the men of the community were more calm than 
the women after the political crisis provoked by the 11
th
 of September and the war in 
Afghanistan. They didn’t want to raise the voice in front of the aggressions, because 
they thought they would have been more attacked if they criticized the government, but 
I wanted to do something.” (Interview with a young woman, speaker of Stop the War of 
Birmingham).  
Taking part in the movement breaks the isolation and creates new solidarities. The 
initiatives against the war can in fact be part of a general movement that see Muslims 
and non-Muslims fighting against “neo-imperialism”, the predominance of the U.S.s.... 
Young Muslims feel that they can radically criticize the politics of the government of 
Tony Blair to follow Bush in the war in Iraq, without being isolated from the British 
society. On the contrary, they fight against the war together with the progressive 
British: “Muslims don’t consider this war as a war to Islam: they are aware of its neo-
imperialist character and they are aware that their force comes from the alliance with 
other people.”  Says another young activist (boy) interviewed.   
Among these “other people”, there is certainly the association Respect, part of Stop 
the war coalition, founded by an ex-Labour party member and active in the social 
forum. Respect is a political party founded in 2004 by the former Labour Member of 
Parliament George Galloway, expelled by the Labour Party for his positions against 
Blair’s choice to go to war against Iraq. An alternative to the Labour Party, the 
coalition Respect has organized its electoral campaign in 2005 on the question of peace 
and in defence of the Muslim community, victims of racist and islamophobic aspects. 
Respect has a great support among the Muslim communities. As young Muslim woman 




Respect considers that cultural and religious differences have to be highly 
respected and has brought this idea inside Stop the war. An example of this is given by 
the day of mobilization against the war of the 18
th
 of November 2002, period of 
Ramadan. In that occasion everybody had the possibility to pray, thanks to a moving 
char where an imam was praying and a big tribune for the imam in Trafalgar Square. 
Another Muslim activist young woman remembers this event:   
“A great participation of  Muslims was foreseen: In order to be sure that this 
presence would be compatible with the religious rule. For this a great tribune was set 
up in Trafalgar Square, so that at the moment of praying an imam would have gone 
there. (…) A Muslim prayer in the centre of London!  Someby was unhappy, but if I 
think that, if we really want terrorism to be isolated, the only way is to make Muslims 
feel part of this movement. It is what happened. They have succeeded in integrating 




The presence of women is one of the most interesting aspects of the movement, but 
it is in general the younger generation who want to express itself without being 
considered “traitors” to the receiving country.  The movement against the war has 
represented for British Muslims the occasion for asserting themselves in the double 
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subjective dimensions of British citizens and Muslims, and, at the same time, opposing 
themselves to Islamophobic aggression, insisting on their condemnation both of 
terrorism and of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.  They found consequently the way to 
escape the isolation where the extreme right forces wanted to force them.  From their 
opposition to terrorism and war, they enlarge progressively their discourse of 
opposition, joining other new global topics. Says another activist –a boy: “ The United 
States impose their choices on everybody on the planet. We are against this 
domination…there is a space for alternative in terms of trade, equal trade, markest, in 
cultural terms, in every sector…I see in the Muslim participation in the movement the 
concrete possibility to contrast the United States, proposing an alternative, with other 
forces who want the same…We are the only ones who can be an obstacle to the 
American domination. “ 
Young Muslims in the UK and in Italy have much in common: their frustration 
with the assimilation Muslim-Terrorist and their double identity. As a young boy says: 
“My friends sometimes “forget” that I am of Arabic origin and some heavy words 
escape…or they ask me what do I think about terrorists as if they did not know me or 
they didn’t know the answer…it is as if they wouldn’t talk with me but with a foreigner, 
a  “Muslim”…” (Selim, 18 years, Egypt) 
“I am very sensitive from this point of view: one day a friend…I do not even know 
why we have ended up to talk about this…but he started to say that Muslims are all 
terrorists…I have asked him to notice that this is impossible, that in the world there are 
other types of terrorism, as in Spain…but he, nothing, he continued in his idea…and 
when, at the end, he had fallen in contradiction, has concluded:” With all that the 
television shows…” (Jassira, 20-Syria-Tunisia) 
This stereotyped image that is imposed on the young people –a real stigma- is in 
complete contradiction with the awareness young people have about the differences of 
the conception and the practices of the Islam according to education and social class. 
They are perfectly aware that there is not just one Muslim identity.  
“Look, culture and education have a great influence on religion. Look…the type of 
education my parents have received, in comparison to what I have received in the 
Italian schools- this influences the mentality. For example, let’s look at the role of the 
woman…for my mother, who went very little to school, a Muslim woman who wears the 
hjiab should not be too much in public, going out, doing sport…for me it is just the 
opposite, in a society that perceives Muslim women negatively, these have to take all 
the rights, to go, to work…to show that we are like the others…”(Karima, 24, 
Morocco) The same Karima insists that men who make heavy comments on women 
who do not wear the veil are the ones who are not cultivated and come from rural areas.  
The interviews show that these young people develop “identity tactics and 
strategies in order to take some distance from the role that the surrounding milieu 
tends to force on them. “ (Frisina, 2005).  They tend to present themselves with a 
double –or even triple- identity, and it is only when the Islam is seen in negative terms, 
as a threat, that they react insisting on their Arab-Muslim identity: “Problems change, 
we grow up, even our identity changes. Already now, I feel myself more Italian than 
Moroccan…maybe in ten years I will feel completely Italian…or I will look at the 
European citizenship.” (Karima, 24 Morocco) 
“When they ask me who I am, where am I from, I say I am in-between…Italian and 
Egyptian…but if I am provoked…then I say I am Egyptian and Muslim…”(Fahima, 17, 
Egypt) 
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According to the sociologists Annalisa Frisina:”Islam is perceived by these young 
people as one of the references, but certainly not the only one. In comparison with their 
parents, it is not only question of “right to difference” (mosques, cemeteries, etc…), 
but right to equality, even remaining Muslims. The question of the citizenship is 
crucial…” (Frisina, 2005, p.156) 
Conclusion 
The conclusion of the paper is that, if peaceful societies, having a high level of social 
cohesion combined with the recognition of cultural pluralism, are a goal for liberal 
thinkers, the main obstacles to implement them do not lie in cultural differences, but in 
political conflicts. General conflicts taking place at world level may influence the 
behaviour of the immigrants. Eventually, this has always been the case: for example, 
during World War 2 for Italians and Germans in the USA and in Canada, during the 
Algerian war for Algerian immigrants in France, and so on… Migration often 
represents a conflicting double system of “allegiance” (the sending and receiving 
country) migrants have to cope with. This complex process should however be 
recognized and analyzed in socio-political terms and through socio-political categories, 
avoiding any stigmatization of cultures, religions
23
 and /or “civilizations”
24
. 
Discrimination of immigrants in social life and labour market represents of course a 
main source of “social stress”, which can encourage deviant behaviour and 
radicalization. However, deviant behaviour can take extremely various forms –for 
example organized crime
25
 or, more often, petty criminality-; it does not necessarily 
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 I am personally extremely critical of theories referring to clash of civilizations, because, in my opinion, 
they are based on an ambiguous overlapping between cultures, religions and civilizations. Religions have 
much larger spheres of influences than just one culture: they are often developed in one culture, but they tend 
to go beyond the borders of their own culture and to expand, adapting themselves to the new cultures. As the 
Italian sociologist of religions, Enzo Pace, writes, a religion represents much more than a culture  [23]. As for 
the concept of “civilization”, numerous researches show that it is a historically constructed concept (see for 
example [24]).Consequently I tend to share the critical point of   Hardt and Negri, who speak of “bizarre 
historical identities called civilizations” [25].  Moreover, borders of civilizations shift and are defined 
according to the historical contexts. What are the borders of the Western “civilization” and the ones of the so-
called “Muslim world”? Where do we put Albania and Bosnia, Muslim countries of Europe? According to 
Hardt and Negri (2004), the pretended “clash of civilizations” are in fact global conflicts between nation 
states and blocs that are not any more justified in ideological terms but rather in cultural-religious terms: 
“Islam-West”.  The Islamic fundamentalist trans-national movement is certainly an important phenomenon of 
our time. It is not however the only religious or ethnic fundamentalist movement existing in the world, even 
if the actions perpetrated have been particularly spectacular and murderous, from the 11
th
 of September in 
New York to the 11
th
 of March in Madrid.      
24
 I was writing this article, when the news of a fundamentalist cell ready to bring attacks to American targets 
in Germany was made public, composed by two Germans converted to Islam and a Turkish German resident. 
In relationship to this fact, the Herald Tribune has written: “ The German plot is another remainder that 
hatred comes in all nationalities. The two suspects are German who converted to Islam and, acting out of a 
pronounced hatred to the United States, went off to Pakistan for training. (…) To some officials, all this 
demonstrated the recruitment prowess of Al-Qaeda. But it is more likely that the two Germans and their 
Turkish accomplice. Were seized first by a pathological hatred of the United States, and then sought out the 
rhetoric of Islamist extremism, just as their predecessors in the Baader-Meinhof gang had affected the 
trappings of radical Marxism.” (Herald Tribune, Tuesday, September 11th, 2007, p. 8).   I fully agree with 
this analysis, reminding as well that terrorism is certainly not a practice specific to Islamic fundamentalism…  
25
 The development of criminal organizations as the “mano nera” or the “mafia –cosa nostra” by the Italians 
in the USA at the end of the XIXth century can be read partly as a reaction to the discrimination of which 
new immigrants were victims (of course many other factors should be also considered). On the contrary, the 
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lead to terrorism. This is the same for radicalization that can be maintained at the 
political debate level, without shifting towards terrorist acts. Cultural stigmatization is, 
however, part of the social stress imposed on immigrants, as even the small research I 
present on second generation Muslims in Italy shows.  
As we have seen, the mobilisation of the Muslim communities in Europe has much 
to do with the social and political participation for the recognition of a specific identity 
that coincides with religion (and with religious practices) and for being accepted both 
as Europeans and Muslims. Opposed to “assimilation”, Muslims seek nevertheless to 
be integrated into European societies. Questions raised by Muslim minorities challenge 
multiculturalism, minorities’ rights and also secularization in nation states where 
religion is separated by political power and is a private affair. However, the issue of 
secularization doesn’t concern only the Islamic religion
26
. 
The hostility of which Muslims are victims is not, by the way, necessarily 
producing a will to separate and shift towards Islamic fundamentalist ideology: on the 
contrary, it can encourage participation in movements where they can express their 
opposition to USA and British policy together with European militants.  
 As a UK Muslim activist of the Stop the war movement says:  “This country is 
their home, The effort of islamic institutions should go even more in a direction of 
moderation in order to show young people that a right apprenticeship of their own 
religion is not contradictory with the concept of belonging and citizenship of the non-
muslim society, where they have chosen to build thier lives. “ 
27
.  
Intercultural and inter-religious dialogues, as well as free and rich political debates, 
are the best answer to prevent the shifting of immigrant Muslim communities in Europe 
towards radical fundamentalist positions justifying or even in favour of terrorism. 
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